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Abstract: The article proposes a reading of Marcel Mauss’s insights into gift exchange in 
primitive societies through the lens of the institutional economics approach. It thus tries to 
demonstrate that the gift as seen by Mauss can be interpreted as an institution arising from 
the self-transcendence of social relationships that gifts themselves are expressly designed to 
create and according to which individuals orient their behavior. On this basis, we provide 
elements to discuss the benefits that might derive from the adoption of the institutionalist 
approach in economics. 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite the undisputed relevance of Bronislaw Malinowski’s and Marcel Mauss’s work to 
economic anthropology, mainstream economics has generally stayed out of the debate, within 
social sciences, on the concept of gift. As known, both Malinowski’s and Mauss’s works, as 
well as much of the literature that they later inspired, were highly critical of the homo 
oeconomicus and the main assumptions of orthodox theory in economics. Mirowski (2001: 
433) sees the concept of gift as constitutive of a series of “traditions” that have unsuccessfully 
“relied upon it to explicate various forms of exchange”, and have been “ultimately vanquished 
qua social theory”. With the result that, Mirowski continues, the attempt itself to use the 
concept of gift with this ambition in mind would only strengthen the primacy of orthodox 
economics. The explicit or not-so-tacit assumption of this reasoning, or of the traditions 
generally referred to in the above reconstruction, is that the gift is the “non-economic” par 
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excellence.1 This paper rejects this assumption. It instead seeks to demonstrate the pertinence 
and relevance of the concept of gift – we borrow the expression from Malinowski (1921: 12) – 
for “refresh[ing] and fertiliz[ing]” economic theory, by deepening our understanding 
(Malinowski again) of the “origins and development of economic institutions”.   
The article focuses on the complexity of the gift as proposed by Mauss in his Essai. 
Mauss’s The Gift represents a sort of (grand) “narrative” (in Lyotard’s 1979 sense, but without 
the negative traits the French philosopher attributed to the concept) about the foundations 
of human societies. As known, differently from another, tremendously influential grand 
narrative, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations2, The Gift established the historical priority of 
gift-giving over market exchange. By focusing on the use Mauss makes of the available 
ethnographic sources about “primitive” societies in Section 2, we advance in Section 3 an 
interpretation of the gift as (essentially) an institution. We argue that it arises from the self-
transcendence of social relationships that gifts themselves are expressly designed to create 
and according to which individuals orient their behavior. The self-transcendence of such 
relationships derives from the fact that if two individuals engage in an exchange, it is because 
a “third term” emerges, being in truth “nothing other than the relation itself, imposing itself 
as a separate actor entirely” (Anspach, 2002: 5) – and therefore something which is, at the 
same time, produced by the exchange itself. Section 4 expounds the main lines of an 
institutional reading of the gift. In Section 5, we show that, by applying to the complexity of 
the gift an institutional approach resting on the tradition of the Old Institutional Economics 
and Veblen’s conception of economics as an evolutionary science, in particular, it becomes 
possible to induce a fertile rethinking of the relationships between market and gift exchange, 
while strengthening the need to adopt an institutional approach in economics. 
 
2. Mauss vs. Smith, or history and nature in two grand political narratives  
In Hirschman’s (1977) reconstruction, Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is the final 
                                                        
1 Consider for instance how Titmuss (1968: 22) presented Mauss’s (1923-24) work as a possible antidote 
to the Institute of Economic Affairs’ market approach to health services. “The grant”, he wrote, “or the 
gift or unilateral transfer – whether it takes the form of cash, time, energy, satisfaction, blood or even 
life itself – is the distinguishing mark of the social … just as exchange or bilateral transfer is a mark of 
the economic”. 
2 For an explicit parallel between the two views, see Douglas 1990. 
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achievement of a long intellectual tradition of a mainly political nature on the benefits of 
capitalism. Montesquieu’s (1748) opening reflections in De l’ésprit des lois were based on the 
dichotomy between passions and interests. In this conception, Hirschman writes, “the age of 
commerce” (the final stage in the evolution of human society according to Smith), which will 
then culminate in the development of capitalism, was to be praised for its capacity to “improve 
the political order” by counteracting socially harmful passions. In the Wealth of Nations, on 
the contrary, Smith apparently dissolves all passions into a self-motivated devotion to 
material wealth and its accumulation (which requires practicing the virtue of abstinence from 
immediate consumption). To reconcile passions and interests, Hirschman continues, Smith 
seems compelled to argue that even the political ambition to gain power is satisfied by 
economic betterment, and that, more in general, non-economic drives are at the service of 
economic impulses, which they nurture and strengthen.  
It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose 
them to turn their stock towards the employments which in ordinary cases are 
most advantageous to the society. But if from this natural preference they should 
turn too much of it towards those employments, the fall of profit in them and the 
rise of it in all others immediately dispose them to alter this faulty distribution. 
Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private interests and passions of 
men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every society, among 
all the different employments carried on in it, as nearly as possible in the 
proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society 
(Hirschman, 1977: 111) 
Hirschman thus commented on Smith’s political grand narrative in 1977. It is a fact, 
however, that in recent decades the literature has made significant progress in deepening our 
understanding of Smith’s vision. Contrary to the decades in which economists were debating 
the “Adam Smith problem”, there seems to be a consensus on the fact that the contradictory 
views of human nature held in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and in the Wealth of Nations 
are not contradictory at all. They are rather seen as compatible and complementary (see for 
instance V. Smith, 1998, 2013; Ashraf et al., 2005). In truth, as is often the case for great 
thinkers, the advent of more refined interpretations of the views of past masters creates 
“majorities” – very heterogeneous indeed – that tend to obfuscate divergences of opinion 
iris-AperTO 
University of Turin’s Institutional Research Information System and Open Access Institutional 
Repository 
about such views. This said, there is widespread agreement that the “Adam Smith problem” 
was in truth the problem of economists who had wrongly identified “self-interest” with 
selfishness and “sympathy” with benevolence in Smith’s theory (see Griswold, 2006; Mehta, 
2006). The “sympathy” which counterbalances, in the Moral Sentiments, the self-regard of the 
Wealth of Nations, while curbing its harmful excesses, is more correctly the human capacity 
to put oneself in another’s place. The “impartial spectator” within us produces an “other than 
self” image of oneself. This device enables the expression of approval and disapproval of 
others’ and, above all, one’s own behavior. The internalized social norm thereby produced, 
rather than benevolence or love for others, helps to redefine and relativize otherwise purely 
individual perspectives. The resulting “general rules of morality” (Smith, 1975b: 319) can thus 
be somehow vague, except for the rules of justice, which are precisely defined and do not 
tolerate exceptions (see Fiori, 2000). 
 Smith was well aware of the complexity of human nature. His world, as Ashraf et al. 
(2005: 142) demonstrate while discussing Smith in light of the recent behavioral literature, “is 
not inhabited by dispassionate rational purely self-interested agents, but multidimensional 
and realistic human beings”. Not only, however, is Adam Smith “too important to be 
surrendered to the hedonistic individualists” (Hodgson, 2013: 13); it would be equally wrong 
to consider him as the theoretical father of the modern neoliberal vision. Smith “was anxious 
that a society governed by nothing but transactional self-interest was no society at all”, 
whereas “neoliberalism is Adam Smith without the anxiety” (Metcalf, 2017; see also Paganelli, 
2008, discussing self-interest in Smith’s two major works as the “Adam Smith problem in 
reverse”). Smith believed that the state should concern itself not only with defending the 
nation, administering justice, and “erecting and maintaining certain public works” (1976: 65), 
but also, and more generally, with addressing the main sources of moral corruption stemming 
from the deepening of the division of labor.  
This however provides an access point to the political dimension of Smith’s project. 
Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its 
Triumph “makes us see the ideological foundations of capitalism in a fresh way”, writes 
Amartya Sen (2013) in the foreword to the book. Leading sociologists (Fourcade and Healy, 
2007) continue to consider it as a framework of relevance to discussing today’s market society 
and moral arguments about it. In the Wealth of Nations, the market system is the last step of 
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a straightforward stage-theory about human evolution centered upon the concept of division 
of labor. This latter is the result of the search – driven by population growth – for more and 
more productive modes of subsistence, granting people the possibility to leave behind the 
original “rude state of society” (Smith, 1976: 276) and to develop progressively more complex 
models of economic organization. But the division of labor cannot uphold the whole 
theoretical edifice without the support of a natural “propensity to truck, barter and exchange 
one thing for another” (Smith, 1975a: 571), which Smith grounds upon people’s natural 
disposition to persuade. One of the most intriguing attempts to reconcile the two presumed 
Smithian views about human nature is Vernon Smith’s interpretation of this disposition as a 
“universal propensity for social exchange … [that] finds expression in both personal exchange 
in small-group social transactions and in impersonal trade through large-group markets”. The 
propensity is thus seen as including “not only goods, but also gifts, assistance, and favors out 
of sympathy” (V. Smith, 1998: 3).  
“It is all in Smith”, one may comment; but what Vernon Smith (2013: 287) aptly wants to 
demonstrate, by examining the role the “impartial spectator” plays, is that “Smith saw the 
individual as not even defined except in a social context”. Yet this is precisely the reason why 
the reconstruction of the passage from primitive to modern societies in the Wealth of Nations 
leaves one dissatisfied. In Smith’s view, the advent of the age of trade completes the passage 
from the “continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their 
superiors” that characterized individuals’ life during feudalism, to one of “order and good 
government”, ensuring “the liberty and security of individuals” (Smith, 1976: 412). Reviving 
the concept of natural order (borrowed from the natural law tradition), Smith counters the 
chaos of war with the free-market system, understood as the loci where that order is reified 
by means of an invisible hand driving the pursuit of a person’s utilitarian interests towards 
realization of the general good of society. The “obvious and simple system of natural liberty”, 
the “liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice” in which, thanks to the existence of “good” 
political and legal institutions rational individuals are allowed to ground their actions in 
instincts and pursue their own interests, therefore produces efficiency and general utility – in 
short, a beneficial social order.  
To replace Hobbes’ solution to  the war of all against all with the intrinsic rationality of 
the market system, Smith abuses the conjectural method whereby facts for which there is only 
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limited, if any, historical evidence are replaced by conjectures based on a philosophical 
analysis of human nature (see Stewart, 1982; Marouby, 2007). Instead of using the 
ethnographic sources which were available to him (two classics of the world travel literature 
by Jesuits missionaries in Canada Pierre-Francois-Xavier de Charlevoix’s Histoire de la 
Nouvelle France, of 1722, and Joseph-François Lafitau’s Moeurs des sauvages americains, of 
1724), the founder of political economy built the bartering-savage stereotype.  
One could argue that Smith is somehow compelled to portray primitive societies as 
savage - that is, the opposite, in negative terms, of civilized societies, their fundamental 
feature being a state of wretchedness, poverty and distress - by his preliminary assumption 
that division of labor and exchange are the drivers of economic development. Primitive 
societies cannot but offer scant incentives to the division of labor and creation of surplus, 
whereby the “wealth, opulence and prosperity” of civilized nations are the result of 
specialization in production. But then, that same assumption requires another one about 
human nature, since savage societies are also the initial stage in human history, and must 
contain modern societies in fieri. It follows that exchange must be somehow natural – this 
naturalness being founded on the analogy that Smith proposes in his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence between bargaining and “the natural inclination every one has to persuade” 
(Smith, 1975: 352) –, market exchange (fully developed in modern societies) being the last 
stage of this evolving natural disposition (see Marchionatti and Cedrini, 2017).  
Alternatively, one could place emphasis on the civilizing role of sympathy, and then on 
the equally civilizing role played by commerce itself. Sympathy is in fact supposed to limit the 
excesses that the pursuit of self-interest is likely to engender. However, it remains an open 
question why individuals should experience sympathy at the edge of societies, when they find 
themselves face to face with “strangers” in a context of radical uncertainty. As Paganelli (2010) 
argues, it may be that commercial societies, frequently exposing individuals to “strangers”, 
help them develop a moral behavior by introducing distance into interpersonal relationships 
– the “distance” wherewith one looks at oneself through the lens of the impartial spectator. 
Commercial societies can therefore be seen as “the environments that most facilitate and are 
amenable to proper and moral behavior” (Paganelli, 2010: 425). 
In any case, a major problem with this perfectly legitimate grand narrative, which also 
represents, not incidentally, the birth of political economy, is that archaic societies are 
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conjecturally reconstructed from the standpoint of civilized societies. Mauss’s The Gift adopts 
a reverse logic: the aim is to study the historical working of archaic societies, with an emphasis 
on the possibility of a non-linear path towards modern market societies. Instead of looking at 
the “early and rude stage of society” (Smith, 1976: 53) to find evidence of the inevitability of 
an evolution driven by population growth, division of labor and natural human propensities, 
Mauss detects elements of the “form and reason of exchange in archaic societies” in the 
development of the legislation on social insurance in capitalist societies. Somehow 
unavoidably, therefore, economic anthropology progressed by debating exactly “the place 
occupied by the ‘economy’ in the society as a whole” (Polanyi, 1977: 35), formalist 
anthropologists proposing interpretations of archaic behavior marked by the adoption of 
Lionel Robbins’s perspective.  
Mauss’s work too had a political dimension and significance, later amplified by a body 
of literature on the political philosophy of gift-giving: “the Essay on the Gift was a part of an 
organized onslaught on contemporary political theory, a plank in the platform against 
utilitarianism” (Douglas, 1990: viii). Mauss directed his attention to the underlying common 
structure of apparently radically heterogeneous phenomena like the “potlatch” ceremony of 
the Kwakiutl on the western coast of British Columbia, Canada, and the “kula” ring of 
intertribal exchange of Melanesia and Polynesia. In direct and explicit opposition to the 
“bartering savage” stereotype, and without making normative assumptions in his turn, Mauss 
maintains that “Homo oeconomicus is not behind us, but lies ahead … For a very long time 
man was something different, and he has not been a machine for very long, made complicated 
by a calculating machine” (Mauss, 1990: 76). Archaic societies (“a regime that must have been 
shared by a very large part of humanity during a very long transitional phase”, ibid.: 46) are 
shaped by exchanges (bargains are only one moment) between collectivities rather than 
individuals. Ceremonies, rites, women, fairs, rather than economically useful things only, are 
the objects of such exchanges. A perpetual cycle of “prestations and counter-prestations” 
(“total services and counter-services”, ibid.: 5), involving at once the economic, juridical, 
moral, aesthetic, religious, mythological, and morphological dimensions, “are committed to 
in a somewhat voluntary form by presents and gifts, although in the final analysis they are 
strictly compulsory, on pain of private or public warfare” (ibid.; 5). An obligation to give is 
accompanied by one to receive and another to reciprocate. Economic categories simply 
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cannot apply: such corporate personalities do not adopt “the cold reasoning of the merchant, 
the banker, and the capitalist” (ibid.; 75). If they hoard, they do so to spend; “they repay with 
interest, but this is in order to humiliate the person initially making the gift or exchange, and 
not only to recompense him for loss caused to him by ‘deferred consumption’” (ibid.).  
In systematizing Boas’s and Malinowski’s previous studies on, respectively, the potlatch 
and the kula, Mauss is evidently attracted by the cyclical aspect of such prestations. On the 
very last page of the Essai, Mauss (1990: 83) refers to the legend of King Arthur and the Round 
Table, “seated round which, the knights no longer fought”. “There was no longer a ‘high table, 
and consequently no more quarrelling”: no one could be excluded, and the highest and 
lowliest places were on the same level. Archaic gift-giving establishes a system, a social 
system: and “the cycling gift system is the society” (Douglas, 1990: ix). Mauss’s gift is a political 
gift aimed at building social bonds through an interactionist logic of alliance and association, 
which is the very logic of the political (Caillé, 1998). “Le roc de la morale éternelle” discovered 
by Mauss is, in the end, egalitarianism: as Sahlins (1972) observed, after Lévi-Strauss (1969), 
Mauss offered “a new version of the dialogue between chaos and covenant” (Sahlins, 1972: 
169): 
Like famous philosophical predecessors [Rousseau, Locke, Spinoza, Hobbes] 
Mauss debates from an original condition of disorder … Against war, exchange … 
The gift is alliance, solidarity, communion – in brief, peace, the great virtue that 
earlier philosophers, Hobbes notably, had discovered in the state … The primitive 
analogue of social contract is not the State, but the gift. The gift is the primitive 
way of achieving the peace that in civil society is secured by the State (ibid.). 
The positive reciprocity of the gift – gifts being given, received and reciprocated in order to 
create, and continuously renew social bonds – connects horizontally (see Adloff, 2016; Hyde, 
1983) rather than vertically. Put differently, it does not dissolve the rival parties within a higher 
unity (the State). “Except for the honor accorded to generosity, the gift is no sacrifice of 
equality and never of liberty”, Sahlins (1972: 170) writes. There is no need to blame Mauss for 
the animism of the hau, the spirit of the thing given, which he identified, in the Gift, as the 
force compelling the donee to return the gift. “By the end of the Essai … the obscure forces of 
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hau were forgotten for a different explanation of reciprocity”, Sahlins concludes: “the gift is 
reason. It is the triumph of human rationality over the folly of war” (175)3. 
 
3. From vengeance to the gift  
As Douglas (1990: xiv) remarks, Mauss’s “discovery” of the gift is the discovery – made by 
directly addressing “the full complexity of human existence” (Hart, 2007: 2) – of “a mechanism 
by which individual interests combine to make a social system, without engaging in market 
exchange”. Let us further investigate the meaning of Mauss’s (1990: 82) famous dictum 
concerning how archaic societies succeeded in  
stabilizing relationships, giving, receiving, and finally, giving in return. To trade, 
the first condition was to be able to lay aside the spear. From then onwards they 
succeeded in exchanging goods and persons, no longer only between clans, but 
between tribes and nations, and, above all, between individuals. Only then did 
people learn how to create mutual interests, giving mutual satisfaction, and, in the 
end, to defend them without having to resort to arms.  
As against “exchangist”-in-nature conceptions of society, French anthropologist Pierre 
Clastres aptly described archaic societies as “spaces of exchange” and “places of violence” at 
the same time (Clastres, 1994: 152). Being economically self-sufficient and politically 
independent, primitive societies were undivided. They were “single totalities” caught in a state 
of permanent war, but this state was functional to preserving autonomy and freedom. The 
possibility of war was the antidote to the undesired outcome of the Hobbesian war, i.e. the 
establishment of political hierarchy, nomination and power of the victor over the vanquished. 
Archaic societies were thus “societies against the state” (Clastres, 1974). The necessary 
“sociological priority of war over alliance” (Clastres, 1994: 160) compelled such societies to 
divide the others into allies and enemies. Since betrayal was always a possibility, networks of 
alliance must be continuously renewed. And alliances rest on exchange – that is, first and 
foremost, on gift exchange. 
There are echoes, here, of what American anthropologist and social theorist Mark 
                                                        
3 “It is by opposing reason to emotion and setting up the will for peace against rash follies … that peoples 
succeed in substituting alliance, gift and commerce for war, isolation and stagnation” (Sahlins, 1972: 
80, emphasis added). 
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Anspach (2002, 2017) would later claim in likening gift exchange with vengeance in reverse. 
War fought by “societies against the state” functions like a game with rules, which are 
functional to impeding the Hobbesian solution from materializing. War itself, or better the 
threat of it, is the mechanism that, prescribing (i.e. institutionalizing) violent reciprocity, 
prevents a logic of “spontaneous” violent reciprocity (Anspach, 2017) from destroying the 
whole community. But there is more. Gift exchange in fact acts as a vehicle of alliance – this 
is why Anspach refers to the concept of vengeance in reverse, or “beginning with the return” 
(ibid.: 9).  
Compared to the negative reciprocity of vengeance, the positive reciprocity of the 
gift involves a reversal in temporal orientation. In negative reciprocity, you take 
action against someone else, and then they make you pay the price by taking action 
against you. In positive reciprocity, on the other hand, you pay the price first: you 
begin by taking action against yourself, in the sense that you give up something, 
and then they take action against themselves – they give up something. They give 
up something after having already gotten their revenge on you (ibid.: 10).  
The parallel is intriguing, for it demonstrates that social bonds require effort to be 
developed. In line with Mauss, both Levi-Strauss (“exchanges are peacefully resolved wars, 
and wars are the result of unsuccessful transactions”; Levi-Strauss, 1969: 67) and Sahlins (1972) 
after him (with his “reciprocity continuum”) insisted on the precariousness of reciprocity. The 
“balanced” reciprocity of do ut des, occupying a middle position between “positive” and 
“negative” reciprocities, is too easy a victim of the two extremes. But vengeance self-reinforces 
itself. You inflict harm or humiliation on someone because s/he has previously harmed you, 
or you kill someone who (because s/he) has previously killed somebody. But s/he who kills in 
revenge becomes the next victim. Vengeance is aimed at destroying the murderer, but in so 
doing, it produces another one. The balance is never restored, for parties disagree on the 
beginning and cannot agree on the end. The only possibility to stop this vicious circle is to 
reverse its logic of vengeance, which however requires effort. To give, exchangers self-impose 
costs, with the aim of fulfilling the other’s desires even before this latter can express them. 
They need to look forward – which amounts to reversing the temporal orientation of 
reciprocity.  
Anspach argues that in book 6 of the Iliad, “Homer inverts Mauss’s dictum by 
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portraying the anticipation of peaceful exchange as the first condition for laying down the 
spear” (Anspach, 2017: 34). On encountering Glakos, Diomedes speaks as follows:  
Well then, you are a guest-friend of mine from far back in our families! Godlike 
Oineus once entertained the excellent Bellerophontes in his house, and kept him 
for twenty days; and they also gave each other fine gifts of friendship… So now 
you have me as your loyal host in the heart of Argos, and I have you in Lycia, 
whenever I come to that country. Let us keep away from each other’s spears, even 
in the thick of the fighting. There are many of the Trojans and their famous allies 
for me to kill… and again many of the Achaians for you to cut down, all those you 
can. And let us exchange armour with each other, so the others too can see that 
we are proud to claim guest-friendship from our fathers’ time. 
In exchanging armour with Glaukos (see Finley’s 1956 now classic The World of 
Odysseus), Diomedes recalls a past exchange of hospitality between Oineus and 
Bellerophontes, but places an emphasis also on a to-be circumstance, a future exchange of 
hospitality between him and Glaukos himself, which acts as prerequisite for the current 
exchange of armour. This, however, is evidently also the precondition for establishing the 
alliance. In this “causal loop of mutual determination”, a self-fulfilling prophecy suddenly 
appears on the scene, so that “the future transaction [can be] at once the product and the 
premise of the present one” (Anspach, 2017: 36). “Beginning with the return” means therefore 
that in gift giving, one gives not to someone who has already given (s/he would return), but 
to the person who will then give in his/her turn (the next giver). But this leaves an important 
question unanswered: how can it become possible to cooperate, in the absence of rocks (like 
past memories in Diomedes and Glaukos’s exchange) that allow future partners to believe in, 
or simply “see” the possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy? Giving is (also) giving oneself, says 
Mauss, yielding to animism when discussing the hau, that is the spirit of the thing given (see 
Aria, 2008). But consider how Mauss (1990: 82) himself concludes his own remark on how 
peoples came to trade by first laying down their spears: “Thus the clan, the tribe, and peoples 
have learnt how to oppose and to give to one another without sacrificing themselves to one 
another”. According to René Girard (1977), sacrifice is the fundamental element upon which 
social order rests. Humans learn to externalize an internal element to which they virtually 
attribute the violence otherwise directed by the group towards a victim. In truth, however, 
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this is a concrete illustration of a more general device whereby in a group, “each [equal] 
individual … recognize[s] the superiority of the higher-order entity formed by all of them 
together” (Anspach, 2017: 46). 
Put differently: how is it that “unconditional” gifts, that is, gifts that are voluntarily 
offered, without guarantee of return (see Caillé, 1998), can play a fundamental role in creating 
and sustaining social bonds and alliances between partners that previously regarded each 
other as potential enemies? Exactly like the violent (negative) reciprocity of vengeance, the 
non-violent (positive) reciprocity of gift-giving (that is, the antithesis of revenge) is but the 
transcendence of interpersonal relations. Individuals can succeed (this is the case of gift 
exchange) in recognizing the “relation” for what it is – the meta-level between individuals 
themselves and the society, the loci where the two dimensions interact, which is in truth self-
transcendent. Or, they simply fail to do so, as in the case of vengeance, and feel compelled to 
act as if their action were dictated by an external force, which they usually reify by 
transforming it, for instance, into God. It is by taking distance from the relation itself (first 
through reification of the relation) that individuals can gain the space for maneuver required 
for turning negative into positive reciprocity. 
 
4. The gift as institution 
Mauss’s ambition in writing The Gift was “to embrace the human condition in its entirety by 
exploring the moral relationship between concrete persons and society as a whole” (Hart, 
2007: 7). In Hart’s view, Mauss was convinced that both a free-market social system and one 
based exclusively on altruism – as Douglas (1990: vii) famously put it, “a gift that does nothing 
to enhance solidarity is a contradiction”; see also Parry, 1986 – were equally utopian. Rather, 
the discovery of the gift as “vengeance in reverse”, that is, as a triggering mechanism, first, for 
the creation of social bonds and, then, as a vehicle for continuously renewing them, rests on 
the idea that “human institutions everywhere are founded on the unity of individual and 
society, freedom and obligation, self-interest and concern for others” (Hart, 2007: 9). This is 
what Mauss shows when addressing, in The Gift, the cycle of prestations and counter-
prestations, the “non-contractual element” in the social contract. The “social glue” is given by 
the “combination of law, state, customs, morality and shared history that it was the 
sociologist’s task to make more visible. The individual is the result of social development and 
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not, as in Smith’s origin myth, its source” (ibid.: 3). 
If neoclassical economists neglected any non-reductionist4 discussion of the gift in the 
post-war literature, this was probably due to the inadequacy, for addressing the gift, of both 
paradigms of the received dichotomy in social theory (see Adloff and Mau, 2006). That is to 
say, neither the fully utilitarian perspective of instrumental rationality embraced by orthodox 
economists, nor non-individualistic normative conceptions of human behavior of sociological 
flavor (which neoclassical economists usually and adamantly reject) can provide the approach 
required to grasp the complexity of Mauss’s gift. Mauss sheds light on a possible relational 
and interactionist theory of society (see also Simmel, 1958), replacing the vagueness and 
intrinsic reductionism of Durkheim’s concept of “conscience collective” with the concreteness 
and complexity of gift-giving. The non-contractual element of the contract is an institution, 
in the sense employed by scholars of the original institutional approach in economics.  
Although there is no consensus on how to define institutions (definitions in social 
sciences usually have fuzzy boundaries, writes Hodgson, 2019), scholars of institutional 
economics share at least a rough common understanding of what institutions are – socially  
operative systems of rules – and the role they perform (they structure social interactions). In 
what follows, we refer to the strand in institutional economics that rests upon the main 
contributions of the so-called “Old Institutional Economic” approach, in the tradition of 
Thorstein Veblen. Specifically, we borrow from the vibrant and multi-faceted line of inquiry 
which considers the economy as an open and evolving system in a natural environment driven 
by technological change, and embedded in a broader set of social, cultural, political and power 
relationships (Hodgson, 2000). This means that the structures of the economy are subject to 
a slow but endless process of change and evolution. The discipline of economics is thus 
conceived as the study of a dynamic system characterized by cumulative causation. The focus 
is not (only) on static equilibria (Dennett, 1995), but on the ongoing processes of change 
regarding human behavior, which is driven by institutions – economic change being 
intrinsically linked to institutional change.  
In this context, the concept of institutions rests on a Veblenian emphasis on the role 
                                                        
4 We use the term “reductionism” to refer to the attempt to reduce the complexity of an object of 
inquiry or an approach by seeking its understanding in one and only one level of explanation (for 
instance, we consider as reductionist the attempt to explain human behavior and social dynamics by 
using economic concepts alone).  
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that habits of thought play in determining individual behavior and social interaction. 
Institutions are therefore social structures with “the potential to change agents, including 
change their purposes or preferences” (Hodgson, 2006: 2). What clearly emerges is the 
interdependence of individuals and institutions. (Today’s) institutions depend in fact on 
individuals and their (past) interactions, as well as on shared patterns of thought; they are 
strongly dependent on the historical and cultural context. Institutions can however mold, 
enable and constrain individuals’ behavior by conditioning ideas and choices (Hodgson 2000, 
2004; Ambrosino, 2012). Reconstitutive upward causation dynamics thus coexist with 
reconstitutive downward causation processes (Hodgson 2003, 2004). Individuals are here 
described in effect as “interactive and partially malleable agents, mutually entwined in a web 
of partially durable and self-reinforcing institutions” (Hodgson, 2000: 325), and constantly 
engaged in cognitive and learning activities. The effectiveness of institutions implies a form 
of collective intentionality that enables individuals to coordinate their expectations about 
others’ behavior. “An individual attributes an intention to the group in which he or she 
belongs while holding that intention and believing that other group members hold it, too” 
(Hodgson, 2006: 7). Behavioral regularities can thus derive from individuals mutually 
believing that others do not have dissimilar aims.  
The fact that Mauss nowhere offers in The Gift a precise definition of the gift (perhaps 
also in reply to Malinowski’s taxonomy of gifts, which included the much contested category 
of “free” gifts as opposed to instrumental or commercial return gifts) helps concentrate on its 
institutional character. Gift-giving in archaic societies can in fact be described as institutions, 
namely as “systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions” 
(Hodgson, 2006: 2). Mauss (1990: 3) himself declares in a Durkheimian perspective that the 
study of the societies that have preceded our own is the study of “total” social phenomena 
where “all kinds of institutions are given expression at one and the same time”. And he claims 
that The Gift concentrates specifically on “the so to speak voluntary character of these total 
services, apparently free and disinterested but nevertheless constrained and self-interested” 
(ibid.). Mauss aptly employs the term “institution” for the “system of total services” (ibid.: 5-
6) – even those “of an agonistic type” (ibid.: 7) – studied in the essay. In their quality as 
institutions, systems of gift exchange constrain behavior by the requirement that three 
institutional rules – the three obligations to give, receive, and return – be respected, under 
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pain of losing authority, status, and ultimately autonomy and independence. Refusing to give, 
receive or even return a gift is tantamount to a declaration of war on the community. But, as 
the analysis of the gift as “vengeance in reverse” has shown, the fact itself that normative 
compulsion and social sanctions do exist signifies that the gift also enables behavior. Gift-
exchange is in fact “not only the significant form in which archaic societies reproduce 
themselves; giving and taking are also the elementary activities through which sociability 
became rich in evolutionary chances, and upon which any community-building process still 
rests” (Berking, 1999: 31).  
Somehow, the gift seems to incorporate the logic of institutions in its purity. To adopt 
a commonly accepted definition, the gift is “every allowance of goods and services made 
without a guarantee of return, with a view to creating, maintaining or regenerating the social 
bond” (Caillé, 2000: 47), with the specification that “in the relationship of gift, the bond is 
more important than the good” (ibid.). In a monetary economy there is no need for trust in 
relationships, because money embeds (at least, until a loss of confidence in the currency’s 
value causes self-fulfilling prophecies of hyperinflation) the self-transcendence of the social 
group that acts as mediator in transactions between individuals (Anspach, 2002). Gifts, on the 
contrary, continuously have to nourish and recreate social bonds, exactly because what 
circulates (when and if it circulates) is the result, not the cause, of social bonds themselves 
(see Godbout, 2007). The symbolic dimension of the gift, in other words, exceeds the 
utilitarian dimension of exchanges (Tarot, 1999). Institutions are what holds society together 
(see Searle, 2005): social bonds are in fact built through an interactionist logic of alliance and 
association. The social bond is thus the byproduct of the gift – the gift, by changing agents’ 
purposes and preferences, makes social bonds possible. It is the reversal in temporal 
orientation produced by the positive reciprocity of the gift with respect to the negative 
reciprocity of vengeance that enables the institution of the gift to “create stable expectations 
of the behavior of others” – thereby “imposing form and consistency on human activities” 
(Hodgson, 2006: 2). The self-transcendence of the social relationship “seen” by agents 
involved in gift exchange is not, one should note, a reified structure existing independently of 
individuals. Rather, it is an emergent property that arises out of the relation itself (see 
Weissman, 2000), and acts as the “mental representation” of the institution (Searle, 2005), 
helping agents to “change aspirations, instead of merely enabling or constraining them”. The 
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self-reinforcing nature of negative reciprocity has in fact, as stated above, a mirror image in 
the positive reciprocity of the gift.  
Consider again Diomedes’s words in the encounter with Glaukos. Past memories in the 
exchange can be virtually taken to symbolize the creation of a habit of thought or behavior 
allowing the rules of the (future) institutional structure to work properly. We have remarked 
that a “causal loop of mutual determination” is involved: it is in fact an expectation of the 
future that allows Diomedes and Glaukos to exchange their armour, but at the same time, 
today’s exchange is a precondition for the future (from a logical point of view) exchange of 
hospitality. This future exchange, in Diomedes’s words, signals “a disposition to engage in 
previously adopted or acquired behavior or thoughts, triggered by an appropriate stimulus or 
context” (Hodgson, 2006: 6), which is the function performed by the present exchange of 
armour. In The Gift, on discussing the “perpetual chain” (Mauss, 1990: 27) of the kula, Mauss 
argues that while an opening gift obliges the receiver to make a gift in her/his turn, agents 
involved in the transaction are “still only half-committed” as partners. “Only the solemn 
observance of the tradition commits one completely” (ibid.: 28). Then, by channeling behavior 
in the sense described by Mauss himself, the prevailing rule structure further reinforces the 
habit among the population. The complexity of the gift, once again, is in fact an illuminating 
example – to be further investigated – of the possibility of “reconstitutive downward 
causation” (Hodgson, 2003, 2004), that is, of the downward effects that institutions can have 
on individual aspirations by giving strength to concordant habits. In the encounter between 
Diomedes? and Glaukos, the exchange of armour makes it possible for “the others too [to] see 
that we are proud to claim guest-friendship from our fathers’ time”.  
But Mauss always refers to gift-giving as a combination of freedom and obligation, as 
if he were trying not to convey a view of individuals as passive executors of exogenous social 
norms. And he constantly warns readers of the impossibility of distinguishing sharply among 
the dimensions comprised in the complex institution of the archaic gift. This latter is “at the 
same time juridical, economic, religious, and even aesthetic and morphological” (1990: 79). 
“Concepts of law and economics that it pleases us to contrast”, like “liberty and obligation; 
liberality; generosity, and luxury, as against savings, interest, and utility”, all contribute to the 
complexity of the gift (ibid.: 73). Furthermore, as Godbout (2004) argues, in the course of The 
Gift Mauss gradually accentuates the emphasis on freedom and progressively reduces the 
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weight of obligation. He does so, for instance, by stressing the cyclical nature of gifts as against 
Malinowski’s notion of free gift. If “gifts are not freely given” and “also not really 
disinterested”, it is because “they already represent for the most part total counter-services, 
not only made with a view to paying for services or things, but also to maintaining a profitable 
alliance, one that cannot be rejected” (Mauss, 1990: 73).  
There is always a problem of tacitness (see Hodgson, 2006) involved in rule-following 
behavior, and behavioral regularities are often considered to derive from intentionality. It 
could be easily argued that the (main) institutional rule of gift-giving is that gifts must be 
reciprocated. Yet, when the “vengeance in reverse” logic is adopted, an alternative rule arises: 
one should give, not to the person who gave, but to the person who will then give in his/her 
turn (according to a “principle of alternation that characterizes most horizontal gifts”, 
Godbout, 1998: 140). To be effective in social contexts, institutional rules cannot be purely a 
matter of conscious deliberation. Nonetheless, the “give to the person who will give” principle 
evidently favors intentionality, at least in Hodgson’s (2006: 5) meaning – that is, intentionality 
“for conscious prefiguration and self-reflexive reasoning, with regard to future events or 
outcomes”. But this is because the institutional structure of the gift exerts its influence on 
social environments shaped by uncertainty and want of freedom. The main institutional rule 
is to offer “unconditional” gifts – that is, ones without guarantee of return. These are situated 
in chains of reciprocity, whose circularity, however, is antithetical to the closeness of the “give 
and take” (see Gasché, 1972).  
The formation of the “bonding-value” (Godbout, 1998: 188) of the gift requires actors – 
all actors, and not only givers, assuming that any counter-gift in fact performs the role of an 
opening gift – to adopt a “rule of the implicit” (ibid.: 186), or even to play, to a certain extent, 
with rules themselves (see Osteen, 2010). Put otherwise, the atmosphere of uncertainty 
produced by the “unconditionality” of gifts, but also the spontaneity that accompanies the act 
of giving, and even the sense of indebtedness – of excess, with respect to the circularity of the 
do ut des – which gifts tend to create is indispensable. Institutions, in general, are intended to 
reduce uncertainty by coordinating individuals’ expectations as regards others’ behavior. The 
institutional dimension of the gift, however, stems directly from the relational character of 
the confidence that individuals – who are heterogeneous agents living in complex social 
environments which induce them to consider others as potential enemies – have to establish 
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in order to learn to lay down their spears. Social bonds reduce uncertainty, but at the same 
time require it in order to continuously reconstruct the alliance. This is why a certain degree 
of freedom (embedded in spontaneity, debt, delay, negation of intentionality) shapes even 
highly institutionalized “horizontal” gifts exchange systems like the kula (see Hyde, 1983). 
As regards intentionality, Mauss’s gift cycle, Douglas (1990: xiv) maintains, “echoes 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand” and acts as its “theoretical counterpart”, two key differences 
being that the gift economy is a visible hand, and as a result “people are more aware of what 
they are doing” (ibid.). This is a major reason why Posner’s (1980) general theory of primitive 
societies seems untenable. Generosity as a social norm can be explained as the result of high 
information and transaction costs (as in Posner’s theory) only by adopting a definition of 
rationality à la Robbins, that is, by neglecting in toto the problem of explaining behavior or 
the relevance of intentionality and morality (see Hodgson, 2013; Marchionatti and Cedrini, 
2017). On the contrary, it is evident that morality matters for individuals, and that institutions 
sustain moral sentiments.  
Modernity (the epoch in which, in Vattimo’s (1991) definition, the fact of being 
“modern” is seen as positive in itself) separates the multiple dimensions that permeate social 
interactions and reduces the gift to one and only one of such dimensions (either interest or 
disinterest, either freedom or obligation, and so on). The obligation inherent in the 
institutional rules of the archaic gift is on the contrary, in many senses, a choice of freedom. 
The obligation to give is a paradoxical obligation to be free and to oblige others also to be free, 
as the politico-economic philosophy of the gift seems to confirm. This is also because, as 
Sahlins (1972) shows, the constraining/enabling dynamics produced by the gift in its quality 
as an institution is ultimately geared to enhancing freedom by impeding those processes of 
accumulation that tend to generate material differences in the community, as well as the 
exploitation of political power that stems from scarcity of resources. Wants can be voluntarily 
limited, since they are not “primary” but “social habits” (Ayres 1944: 84); in archaic societies, 
“freedom to gain at others’ expense is not envisioned by the relations and forms of exchange” 
(Sahlins, 1972: 162)5. 
                                                        
5 An illustration of the complexity of the dynamics among institutional rules, obligation and freedom is 
provided by John Maynard Keynes’s global reform plans of the 194os. These latter rested upon the idea that the 
desired new international monetary system should promote economic integration by enhancing, rather than 
constraining, member countries’ policy space and right to autonomy in designing development and growth 
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5. On the necessity of the institutional perspective in economics 
The interpretation proposed here of the gift as an institution does not require any auxiliary 
assumption concerning human nature. Mauss himself defines as ethically desirable precisely 
what all known societies seem to consider exactly as such: an invariant core, common to all 
ethics. What people must do is no longer intrinsically different from what they in fact do 
(Caillé, 1998). Due to the narrowness of the utilitarian perspective, orthodox economists seem 
unable to address the gift without at the same time postulating its non-existence. On the 
contrary, in explaining the evolutionary nature of social and economic systems, the social 
sciences literature on gift-giving, following Mauss’s example, employs a conception of 
individuals as “institutionalized” (Hodgson, 2000) agents – the conception that lies at the core 
of the original institutional economics approach. As Hamilton (1932: 89) observed, 
“institutions and human actions, complements and antitheses, are forever remaking each 
other in the endless drama of the social process”. Individuals interact also on the basis of 
habits and customs (Commons, 1934), in “an open and evolving social system situated in a 
natural environment, effected by technological change, and embedded in a broader set of 
social, cultural, political and power relationships” (Hodgson, 2000: 318). 
A possible limitation of Mauss’s analysis is that it provides an explanation of the 
emergence and persistence of cooperation that rests on cultural bases alone, and needs to be 
supplemented by the biological and psychological considerations required to understand the 
evolution of morality as a social phenomenon. Here we only point out that the moral and 
political philosophy of the gift (and in general contractualist theories) can receive adequate 
psychological and biological supporting evidence from research works like Tomasello’s (2016). 
The main thesis is that the emerging moral psychology of early humans (which represented 
the first evolutionary step in the history of the social contract, and of the development of 
cooperative rationality) is to be characterized “as a new set of psychological adaptations for 
functioning within a new set of social conditions” (ibid.: 79). Tomasello concludes: “the 
natural home of human morality … is cooperative activity for mutual benefit” (ibid.). As his 
studies on children in their early years show (Tomasello, 2009), inherited dispositions are 
                                                        
policies. Marchionatti and Cedrini’s (2017) reflections on this include an anthropological-in-essence analysis of 
Keynes’s solutions for the remedying of global imbalances in 1919 and 1945, at the end of the two world wars.   
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then shaped by culture.  
 In any case, the idea of treating the gift as an institution seems potentially promising 
for “refreshing and fertilizing” economic theory. Recognition of the historical priority of gift-
giving over market exchange can in fact not only demonstrate the adequacy of the 
institutional approach to the gift itself, but also strengthen the case for an institutional 
perspective in economics tout court. Space constraints prevent us from discussing in detail 
the recent anthropological literature on the relationships between the two spheres of market 
exchange and gift-giving (see Negru, 20106; Hodgson, 2013; Marchionatti and Cedrini, 2017). 
Nevertheless, it seems evident that only an institutional-evolutionary perspective can provide 
the theoretical framework and tools required for a thorough analysis of the evolution of the 
forms and reason of social exchange from archaic to capitalist societies, and that the concepts 
of institution and morality are more urgently needed than ever to investigate today’s socio-
economic systems.  
 As Searle (2005: 2) argues, “given the centrality of institutional phenomena, it is 
somewhat surprising that institutional economics has not always been at the center of 
mainstream economics”. A possible answer might be that mainstream economics is anchored 
to a triptych composed of far-sighted rationality, methodological individualism and method 
of general equilibrium, as opposed to the “institutions-history-social structure nexus” (Davis, 
2008: 58) of heterodox economics. There are reasons to believe that the current trend of 
specialization in economic research (see Cedrini and Fontana, 2018) is favoring a more 
pluralistic mainstream, wherein the possibility of developing an alternative evolutionary 
paradigm (see Hodgson and Stoelhorst, 2014; Ambrosino, 2016) could provide economics with 
the “system view” informing Veblen’s conception of economics as an evolutionary science 
(Winter, 2014: 638). Collaboration with other disciplines might be the means to achieve this 
result. Economists should “cast themselves as evolutionary social scientists first, and as 
economists only second” (Stoelhorst, 2014: 679), and participate in the “meta-project” of a 
“large-scale evolutionary framework developed by natural science and increasingly accepted 
                                                        
6 Negru makes an interesting case for what she defines as “institutional pluralism”. Economists, she 
maintains, should view the modern economy as a “gift-market nexus”, and recognise that “the mix of 
institutions is more important than the individual institutions themselves: economic analysis 
therefore needs to examine the institutional factors that give rise to the specific mix of form of gifts 
and markets within different economic systems” (Negru, 2010: 194, 202). 
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by social disciplines” (Winter, 2014: 638). 
A multidisciplinary team of social scientists has recently (starting from Henrich et al., 
2001) provided evidence – by conducting behavioral experiments in a series of small-scale 
societies – of the inadequacy of the textbook representation of Homo economicus, and the 
importance of the theoretical alternatives offered by so-called “economics of reciprocity” and 
the like. Besides showing that the orthodox model of human behavior is systematically 
violated, these studies suggest that agents’ preferences are far from exogenous, and that they 
are rather shaped by social (including economic) interactions of everyday life. These results 
are certainly compatible with, and would likely be strengthened by, the main argument put 
forward in this paper. That is to say, for a variety of reasons, including some of methodological 
nature, Mauss’s gift provides a striking illustration of the necessity of an institutional 
approach in economics. The Gift offers in fact a multidisciplinary, comparative, and non-
reductionist perspective on both the complexity of human action and the evolving system 
produced by agents’ interactions. This system is embedded in a wide range of social, cultural, 
and political relationships, while individuals are influenced by the specific institutional 
structures characterizing their living environment. Mauss helps us recognize that it would be 
an error to insist on the naturalness of specific systems, and that it is necessary to consider 
both common characteristics in all socio-economic systems and the variety of particular forms 
they exhibit (see Hodgson, 2003). It is by focusing on the adventures of the difference - that 
is, primarily on the difference of institutional structures and on their evolution - that another 
narrative – and other systems as well – can emerge.  
 
References 
Adloff, F. (2016), Gifts of Cooperation, Mauss and Pragmatism, London: Routledge. 
Adloff, F. and S. Mau (2006), “Giving Social Ties: Reciprocity in Modern Society”, Archives 
Européennes de Sociologie, 47(1): 93–123. 
Ambrosino, A. (2012), “Cognizione ed evoluzione istituzionale: un rilevante punto di 
contatto fra Hayek e la teoria del cambiamento istituzionale di Veblen”, Studi e Note in 
Economia, 17(2): 219-247. 
Ambrosino, A. (2016), “Heterogeneity and Law: Toward a Cognitive Legal Theory”, Journal of 
Institutional Economics, 12(2): 417-442. 
iris-AperTO 
University of Turin’s Institutional Research Information System and Open Access Institutional 
Repository 
Anspach, M.R. (2002), A charge de revanche. Figures élémentaires de la réciprocité, Paris: Seuil. 
Anspach, M.R. (2017), Vengeance in Reverse: The Tangled Loops of Violence, Myth, and 
Madness, East Lansing: Michigan University Press.  
Aria, M. (2008), “Dono hau e reciprocità. Alcune riletture antropologiche di Marcel Mauss”, 
in M. Aria and F. Dei (eds), Culture del dono, Roma: Meltemi, 181–219. 
Ashraf, N., C.F. Camerer, and G. Loewenstein (2005) “Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3): 131–145. 
Ayers, C.E. (1944), The Theory of Economic Progress, Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Boas, F. (1897) ,The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians, Report 
of National Museum of National History for 1885.  
Berking, H. (1999), Sociology of Giving, London: Sage. 
Caillé, A. (1998), Il terzo paradigma. Antropologia filosofica del dono. Torino: Bollati 
Boringhieri. 
Caillé, A. (2000), “Gift and Association”, in A. Vandevelde (ed.), Gifts and Interests, Leuven: 
Peeters, 47–55. 
Cedrini, M., and M. Fontana (2018), “Just Another Niche in the Wall? How Specialization Is 
Changing the Face of Mainstream Economics”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 42(2): 
427–451. 
Clastres, P. (1987[1974]), Society Against the State. Essays in Political Anthropology, 
Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
Clastres, P. (1994[1980]), Archeology of Violence, New York: Semiotext(e).  
Commons, J.R. (1934), Institutional Economics, New York: Macmillan. 
Davis, J.B. (2006), “The Turn in Economics: Neoclassical Dominance to Mainstream 
Pluralism?”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 2(1): 1-20.  
Dennett, D.C. (1995), Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, London: 
Allen Lane. 
Douglas, M. (1990), “Foreword”, in M. Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in 
Archaic Societies, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, vii-xviii. 
Durkheim, E. (1893), The Division of Labour, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe.  
Finley, M.I. (1956), The World of Odysseus, London: Chatto & Windus. 
Fiori, S. (2000), Ordine, mano invisibile, mercato. Una rilettura di Adam Smith, Milano: UTET. 
iris-AperTO 
University of Turin’s Institutional Research Information System and Open Access Institutional 
Repository 
Fourcade, M. and K. Healy (2007), “Moral Views of Market Society”, Annual Review of 
Sociology, 33(1): 285-311. 
Gasché, R. (1972), “Heliocentric Exchange”, L’Arc, 48: 70–84. 
Girard, R. (1977), Violence and the Sacred, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Godbout, J.T. (1998) (in collaboration with A. Caillé) The World of the Gift, Montreal and 
Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Godbout, J.T. (2004), “L’actualité de l’«Essai sur le don»”, Sociologie et sociétés, 36(2): 177–
188. 
Godbout, J.T. (2007), Ce qui circule entre nous. Donner, recevoir, rendre, Paris: Seuil.   
Griswold, C.L. (2006), “Imagination: Morals, Science, and Arts”, in K. Haakonssen (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
22-56. 
Hart, K. (2007), “Marcel Mauss: In Pursuit of the Whole. A Review Essay”, Comparative 
Study in Society and History, 49(2): 1-13. 
Hamilton, W.H. (1932), “Institution”, in E.R.A. Seligman (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, vol. 8, London: Macmillan, 84-89. 
Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis and R. McElreath (2001), “In 
Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies”, 
American Economic Review, 91(2): 73-78. 
Hirschman, A.O. (1977), The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism 
Before Its Triumph, Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
Hodgson, G.M. (2000), “What is the Essence of Institutional Economics?”, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 34(2): 317–329. 
Hodgson, G.M. (2003), “The Hidden Persuaders: Institutions and Individuals in Economic 
Theory”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27(2): 159-175.  
Hodgson, G.M. (2004), The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and 
Darwinism in American Institutionalism, London and New York: Routledge. 
Hodgson, G.M. (2006), “What are Institutions?”, Journal of Economic Issues, 40(1): 1-25. 
Hodgson, G.M. (2013), From Pleasure Machines to Moral Communities: An Evolutionary 
Economics without Homo Economicus, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Hodgson, G.M. (2019), “Taxonomic Definitions in Social Science, with Firms, Markets and 
iris-AperTO 
University of Turin’s Institutional Research Information System and Open Access Institutional 
Repository 
Institutions as Case Studies”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 15(2): 207-233. 
Hodgson, G.M. and J. Stoelhorst (2014), “Introduction to the Special Issue on the Future of 
Institutional and Evolutionary Economics”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 10(4): 
513-540. 
Hyde, L. (1983), The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property, New York: Vintage. 
Lawson, T. (2015), “What Is an Institution?”, in S. Pratten (ed.), Social Ontology and Modern 
Economics, New York: Routledge, 19-52. 
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1969[1950]), Introduction to the Works of Marcel Mauss, London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. 
Lyotard, J.F. (1979), La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le Savoir, Paris: Éditions de Minuit.  
Malinowski, B. (1921), “The Primitive Economics of the Trobriand Islanders”, The Economic 
Journal, 31(121): 1–16. 
Marchionatti, R. and M. Cedrini (2017), Economics as Social Science: Economics Imperialism 
and the Challenge of Interdisciplinarity, London and New York: Routledge. 
Marouby, C. (2007), “Adam Smith and the Anthropology of the Enlightenment: The 
‘Ethnographic’ Sources of Economic Progress”, in L. Wolff and M. Cipolloni (eds), The 
Anthropology of the Enlightenment, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 85-102. 
Mauss, M. (1990[1923–24]), The Gift. The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Metcalf, S. (2017), “Neoliberalism: the Idea that Changed the World”, The Guardian, August 
18, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-the-idea-that-
changed-the-world (accessed: February 1, 2019). 
Mehta, P.B. (2006), “Self-interest and Other Interests”, in K. Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Adam Smith, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 246–269. 
Mirowski, P. (2001), “Refusing the Gift”, in S. Cullenberg, J. Amariglio and D.F. Ruccio (eds), 
Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge, London and New York: Routledge, 431–458. 
Montesquieu (2001[1748]), The Spirits of Laws, Kitchener: Batoche Books. 
Negru, I. (2009), “The Plural Economy of Gift and Markets”, in R.F. Garnett Jr, E. Olsen, M. 
Starr (eds), Economic Pluralism, London: Routledge, 194-204. 
Osteen, M. (2010), “Jazzing the Gift: Improvisation, Reciprocity, Excess”, Rethinking 
Marxism. A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 22(4): 569-580. 
iris-AperTO 
University of Turin’s Institutional Research Information System and Open Access Institutional 
Repository 
Paganelli, M.P. (2008), “The Adam Smith Problem in Reverse: Self-Interest in The Wealth of 
Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments”, History of Political Economy, 40(2): 365-
382. 
Paganelli, M.P. (2010), “The Moralizing Role of Distance in Adam Smith: The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments as Possible Praise of Commerce”, History of Political Economy, 42(3): 
425–441. 
Parry, J. (1986), “The Gift, the Indian Gift and the ‘Indian Gift’”, Man, 21(3): 453–473. 
Polanyi, K. (1977), The Livelihood of Man, H.W. Pearson ed., New York: Academic Press. 
Posner, R. (1980), “A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law”, The Journal 
of Law and Economics, 23(1): 1-53. 
Sahlins, M. (1972), Stone Age Economics, Chicago: Aldine. 
Searle, J. (2005), “What is an Institution?”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 1(1): 1-22. 
Sen, A. (2013[1996]), “Foreword”, in A. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests. Political 
Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
[1977], ix-xix. 
Simmel, G. (1958[1908]), Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, 
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 
Smith, A. (1975a[1763]), Early Draft in Lectures on Jurisprudence, in Glasgow Edition of the 
Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. V, R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael and P.G. 
Stein eds, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Smith, A. (1975b[1759]), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in Glasgow Edition of the Works and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. I, D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Smith, A. (1976[1776]) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in 
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. II, R.H. Campbell 
and A.S. Skinner eds, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Smith, V. (2013), “Adam Smith: From Propriety and Sentiments to Property and Wealth”, 
Forum for Social Economics, 42(4): 283–297. 
Smith, V. (1998), “The Two Faces of Adam Smith”, Southern Economic Journal, 65(1): 1-19. 
Stewart, D. (1982[1793]), Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, in Glasgow Edition 
of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. III, W.P.D. Wightman ed., Oxford: 
iris-AperTO 
University of Turin’s Institutional Research Information System and Open Access Institutional 
Repository 
Clarendon Press. 
Stoelhorst, J.W. (2014), “The Future of Evolutionary Economics Is in a Vision from the Past”, 
Journal of Institutional Economics, 10(4): 665-682. 
Tarot, C. (1999), De Durkheim à Mauss, l'invention du symbolique: Sociologie et sciences des 
religions, Paris: La Découverte/MAUSS. 
Titmuss, R.M.T. (1968), Commitment to Welfare, London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Tomasello, M. (2009), Why We Cooperate, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Tomasello, M. (2016), A Natural History of Human Morality, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Veblen, T. (2007[1899]), The Theory of the Leisure Class, ed. by M. Banta, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Vattimo, G. (1991), The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Weissman, D. (2000), A Social Ontology, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Winter, S. (2014), “The Future of Evolutionary Economics: Can We Break Out of the 
Beachhead?”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 10(4): 613-644.  
 
 
